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I

f one were to ask the “man or woman in the
street” about security and water quality, it is likely
that he or she would be able to explain on some
level the potential danger associated with
contamination of the drinking water supply. Indeed,
even before the tragic events of September 11, 2001,
President Clinton issued Presidential Decision
Directive PDD 63, which designated the water
infrastructure along with several other classes of
infrastructure as “critical.” The U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) was designated as the
lead agency for the water sector and is responsible
for developing plans to improve water infrastructure
security. The significance of potential vulnerabilities
to wastewater infrastructure are less immediately
obvious but potentially as catastrophic. This article
explains the basis of security concerns for
wastewater infrastructure, discusses current
practices in the area of wastewater vulnerability
assessment and mitigation, and highlights efforts to
expand the knowledge base of this emerging area.

Background
Contingency planning for extreme events has long
been standard practice for designers and operators
of wastewater and stormwater infrastructure. For
decades, good practices have required consideration
of the potential impact of severe natural events,
including floods, hurricanes, blizzards, and
earthquakes. These possibilities have been included
both in wastewater and stormwater infrastructure
design and in emergency preparedness and disaster

JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY WATER RESEARCH AND EDUCATION

response planning. The potential consequences of
vandalism and employee misconduct may also have
been considered. Today, there is a new focus of
concern: the possible effects of intentional acts by
domestic or international terrorists.
As a result, forward thinking wastewater systems
are assessing and mitigating their vulnerabilities to
this new area of concern. These systems are,
however, challenged by the fact that water and
wastewater security is an emerging area of practice
that has evolved over just the last two years.
Fortunately, rapid progress has been made in
expanding the knowledge base required to secure
wastewater infrastructure. The EPA, water and
wastewater associations, utilities, and other
institutions have worked together to identify and
address areas of need. In many cases, practices
and tools from other sectors for which security has
been a long-term concern are being adapted to water
and wastewater security. Finally, focused research
is being used to fill data gaps and address
wastewater-specific issues.
This is, nevertheless, an area of challenge for
owners and managers of wastewater infrastructure.
Currently, the assessment and mitigation of
vulnerabilities is voluntary. Unlike water systems,
wastewater and stormwater systems are not facing
mandatory requirements (see below). Wastewater
systems are, however, faced with other legal
requirements and other pressures, including the
challenges associated with maintaining aging
infrastructure that also requires substantial
investments. As a result, water and wastewater
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utility managers must balance external demands for
security measures with the internal resources to
develop and finance improvements.

Overview of Wastewater Treatment
Systems
Wastewater infrastructure consists of the
collection, conveyance, sewer, and treatment system.
The collection system is comprised of a network of
pipes, conduits, structures, devices, and
appurtenances for the collection, transportation, and
pumping of wastewater. Some of the underground
structures, particularly those intended to contain
stormwater following heavy rainfall, can be quite
large. While much of the collection system is
underground, some essential components (e.g.,
pumping equipment) are above ground. There are
three basic types of sewers: sanitary, storm, and
combined. Sanitary sewers contain domestic,
commercial, and industrial wastewater, which is
conveyed to the treatment plant. Storm sewers
contain only stormwater and other runoff, which
usually goes directly to a water body, such as a river
or stream. Combined sewers are typically located
in older metropolitan areas and are used to collect
both wastewater and stormwater, which is conveyed
to the treatment plant. Typically wastewater and
stormwater flows through the collection system
under gravity or a combination of gravity and
pumping, depending on topographic conditions.
Figure 1 shows the sequence of the unit processes
used at a typical wastewater treatment plant in the
United States. During preliminary treatment, the first
step in the process, large debris and a varied
assortment of undesirable solids (e.g., grit, sand, and
rags) and other components are removed using
screens, shredding devices, grit removal systems,
and possibly chemical addition. Preliminary treatment
is followed by primary treatment (sometimes termed
primary clarification), where gravity is used to
separate and remove suspended and floating
material. In the secondary treatment phase,
biological treatment is used to decrease the
concentration of dissolved, colloidal, and suspended
organic material in the wastewater. The most
common process, the activated sludge process,
utilizes aerated biological reactors or tanks containing
an established mixed population of microorganisms
in the presence of oxygen and trace amounts of
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Figure 1 Flow Diagram for Wastewater Treatment Plant

nutrients for treatment. Secondary treatment also
involves secondary clarification, where solids
generated by the process are removed and sent to
solids handling. The liquid separated by this
clarification step may be subject to further chemical,
physical, or biological treatment (advanced
treatment) and will very likely be disinfected to
destroy pathogenic organisms before discharge. The
most common disinfection agent is chlorine. Other
systems use sodium hypochlorite, ultraviolet radiation
(UV) or ozonation. Because the solids settled or
otherwise removed during wastewater treatment are
unstable and contain pathogenic organisms, they
must be treated before disposal. This solids
treatment is also a multi-step process. The first two
steps are thickening (volume reduction by removal
of water using a variety of processes and
equipment) and stabilization (anaerobic or aerobic
biological processing or chemical treatment to
decrease levels of volatile materials and pathogens).
Dewatering, composting, or thermal drying follow.
The solids are then disposed of by either burial in a
landfill; beneficial reuse (e.g., as a soil amendment);
or incineration.

Assessing Wastewater System
Vulnerabilities
On June 12, 2002, President Bush signed the
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (PL 107188) into law. This Act requires community water
systems serving populations of greater than 3,300 to
conduct and submit to EPA vulnerability assessments
and to develop or upgrade emergency response
plans. All of these water systems were required to
assess and report on their vulnerabilities by June
2004. Although legislative initiatives have been
introduced (e.g., S. 1039, The Wastewater
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Treatment Works Security Act), there is currently
no mandatory requirement that these be conducted.
There are unique security concerns related to
wastewater and stormwater infrastructure, and a
specific vulnerability assessment methodology has
been developed to address these concerns. This
methodology, the Vulnerability Self Assessment Tool
or (VSAT™), is a software program developed by
the Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies
(AMSA). It provides a structured approach for
utilities to assess vulnerabilities and identify
countermeasures to reduce risks. The methodology
was subsequently adapted for combined water and
wastewater utilities and is available free. More
information is available at www.vsatusers.net. The
Water Environment Federation (WEF) has been
conducting free training workshops on conducting
vulnerability assessments with this tool. Information
on these sessions is available at www.wef.org/
watersecurity.
Vulnerability assessment methodologies for the
water/wastewater sector are now well-established.
In addition to VSAT™, some wastewater utilities
are utilizing RAM-W (Risk Assessment
Methodology–Water), which was developed by
Sandia National Laboratories and the American
Water Works Association Research Foundation
(AwwaRF), to conduct vulnerability assessments.
Combined water/wastewater utilities and stand alone
wastewater utilities of various sizes are working to
identify and prioritize security concerns, conduct
vulnerability assessments, and develop security plans.
In the past, vulnerability assessments have
typically been used for facilities such as nuclear or
chemical plants where the physical assets are usually
centralized and have likely been laid out with security
concerns in mind. Wastewater and stormwater
physical infrastructure are often highly dispersed
geographically which presents challenges for
ensuring their protection. Furthermore, concerns
regarding collection systems can involve their
potential to provide unrestricted access to
government buildings, financial centers, hospitals, and
other sensitive targets. Large diameter gravity
sanitary, storm, or combined sewers could be
accessed via manholes, inlets, or overflow
structures.These systems are large enough to allow
individuals using them to pass undetected beneath
city streets. Another specific concern relates to the
potential for destruction that could occur if highly
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flammable or explosive substances are introduced
into the wastewater collection system of a major
metropolitan area. The level of destruction that has
resulted from accidental releases has been
significant, including destroying streets and buildings
within the vicinity of the explosion. Historical
accounts of accidental releases of flammable or
explosive materials being deposited into wastewater
systems substantiate the potential for widespread
devastation from an intentional act.
There are specific concerns related to the
wastewater treatment as well as collection systems.
Interruption of the wastewater treatment process,
for example, by the introduction of substances toxic
to the microorganisms in the treatment process, can
shut down treatment for some time, potentially
causing sewer backups and/or overflows. This can
lead to widespread environmental and public health
impacts, with subsequent economic impacts and an
erosion of public confidence.
For drinking water systems, contamination water
has been identified as the highest priority important
security concern, and it is the subject of a
considerable amount of research and development.
Much of this research is focused on “early warning
systems.” Early warning systems will be designed
to rapidly detect contamination events in drinking
water systems, with the goal of avoiding or
significantly reducing the most serious consequences
of such an event. The concerns for intentionally
introduced toxic substances in wastewater systems
are different in many ways than those for drinking
water systems and offer a unique set of detection
challenges. However, there are certain parallels
between the reliable detection of intentionally
introduced toxics in wastewater and drinking water
systems that will provide mutual benefits through
continued research and development. The benefits
of research and development on early warning of
potentially disruptive toxic occurrences in
wastewater systems will be improved process control
both in “routine” operations, and in the event of a
terrorist attack.
Hazardous chemicals used and stored at
wastewater treatment plants could be used by
terrorists or vandals in acts of sabotage. Chlorine
can be of particular concern, and some systems in
sensitive locations have elected to discontinue its
use. However, a recent survey conducted by the
WEF does not suggest that this practice is
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widespread. Nearly 300 wastewater treatment plants
in the US responded to the survey conducted in late
2003, and about 40% reported using chlorine gas
for disinfection. About one third of respondents
indicated that they were considering a change in
disinfection practices. Of these facilities, over 60%
cited regulatory or safety concerns as the reason,
while only 5% cited security concerns as the main
reason for a change (WEF 2004).
The information technology systems of
wastewater utilities may also prove to be vulnerable.
Most modern facilities include supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA) systems–many
designed to completely replace manual operation of
a facility. Hacking into these systems could be used
to cause overflows or interrupt treatment processes
causing back-ups. The Water Environment
Research Foundation (WERF) is responding to these
concerns with a project to provide guidance to utilities
on how to secure and protect computerized and
automated systems using currently available
technologies to sense and correct security breaches.
Initial findings from this work should be available to
wastewater utilities in early 2005.

Identifying and Prioritizing Threats
To Wastewater Systems
As more wastewater utilities have begun to
perform vulnerability assessments, the need for
guidance on which threats to consider during this
process has been identified. This type of guidance
has been available to water utilities for some time.
EPA, under the direction of Congress, developed a
Baseline Threat Document that provides water utility
security teams with a way to identify the most
relevant threats for their facility. EPA emphasizes
that the document was not designed as an exclusive
list of threats for a utility to consider and that the
utility team should meet regularly with law
enforcement personnel, public health agencies, and
other stakeholders in the community to develop a
site-specific threat listing for their vulnerability
assessment. Nevertheless, water systems have
found the guidance valuable and wastewater utilities
are seeking a similar resource. EPA and WEF are
working jointly to develop similar guidance for
wastewater utilities. This guidance should be
available late in 2004.
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Reducing Vulnerabilities
Many utilities have found that changing
operational practices can be a very cost-effective
way of decreasing vulnerabilities. This requires
training to build awareness and reinforce good
practices such as consistent use of employee/
contractor badges, pass codes, locks, and so forth.
Rigorous chain-of-custody procedures should be used
for the acceptance of chemical deliveries.
Employees should be trained to identify and respond
to suspicious behavior or to recognize indications of
the presence of biological or chemical contamination.
All employees should be aware of the existence of
the facility’s emergency response plan and what they
should do in the event that it is activated. Regular
drills and tabletop exercises can be helpful, and liaison
with local emergency responders is essential. Some
wastewater utilities are reaching out to local law
enforcement personnel who may be unfamiliar with
the nature of the operations and materials at the
site. USEPA Region 1 has developed a poster and a
visor card that water treatment facilities can use to
educate their local police and the tips provided via
these products may also be helpful for wastewater
systems. Copies of these materials can be obtained
at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/security/flyers/
index.html. Samples of materials useful for public
outreach and for distribution to the news media are
also available at this address. It is important that
every facility identify a single, trained spokesperson
to communicate to the media should an event occur.
Messages must also be coordinated with public health
authorities to ensure that the information
disseminated to the public is consistent and clear.
Wastewater systems are becoming aware of the
need to locate and secure critical business documents
and records, including “as-built” drawings,
procurement records, legal documents, and a detailed
contact list of customers and employees. Some of
these records may be deemed sensitive in nature,
and access to them will be controlled. Others may
prove to be essential in ensuring a utility keeps running
in the face of a threat. These “knowledge base
assets” need to be organized and securely
maintained. In some cases, copies should be made
and kept off-site.
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Other Areas of Development
Wastewater utilities have unique concerns related
to the disposal of residues from the cleanup of
chemical, biological, or radiological incidents.
Wastewater systems may be asked to accept
decontamination residues or contaminants may be
washed into wastewater or stormwater systems by
storm events or by emergency-response personnel
during an incident. Treatment plant managers are
seeking guidance on how to treat or dispose of these
residues. EPA is working with AMSA to develop
guidance for wastewater utilities on the safe handling
and disposal of contaminated wastes. These
contaminated wastes could result from a direct
attack on the wastewater system or from a
contamination/decontamination event on another
target in the system’s service area. The guidance
will better prepare wastewater utilities to effectively
address worker safety, impacts on their treatment
systems (including biosolids), and public health and
environmental concerns. Progress on this study will
be reported at http://www.amsa-cleanwater.org/
advocacy/security/.
The Water Environment Research Foundation is
working on a number of projects some of which are
in collaboration with AwwaRF. The projects cover
a range of issues, including guidance to utilities on
how to interact with the public, develop contingency
plans, or evaluate “hardening” options (physical
security measures). Other projects address specific
technological applications, such as methodologies and
technologies to identify, screen, and treat chemical,
biological, and radiological contaminants in
wastewater. The previously mentioned guidance for
utilities on securing computerized and automated
systems also is a collaborative effort of WERF and
AwwaRF.
Finally, designers and managers of wastewater
treatment systems have expressed a strong need
for peer-reviewed information on best security
practices for wastewater and stormwater system
design, operation, maintenance, retrofit, and upgrade.
Water Environment Federation (WEF) is developing
consensus guidance materials that address how to
include security and emergency response
considerations into the design, construction, operation,
and maintenance of wastewater collection and
treatment facilities and stormwater systems.
Considerations regarding minimizing effects of
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natural disasters are also being addressed, and this
guidance will help systems of all sizes lower security
risks and improve emergency response. Sizeappropriate approaches and cost considerations will
be identified to address specific security concerns.
It is anticipated that a draft will be available late in
2004. WEF is working on this project in partnership
with the American Water Works Association
(AWWA), which is focusing on developing similar
guidance materials for water utilities and the
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), which,
in turn, is focusing on “methodologies and
characteristics,” such as contaminant and flow
modeling.
The wastewater/stormwater security guidance
materials will reflect a consensus evaluation of sound
security-related practices. Examples of design
considerations to be addressed include system
redundancy and back-up, location and hardening of
mission-critical assets, and design of hazardous
materials storage/handling systems. Operations and
maintenance guidance will also cover a wide range
of issues from employee screening and training;
working with the public; coordination and outreach
with local emergency response personnel; use of
sensing and detection equipment, etc. Some of these
measures, though considered in the context of
security and emergency response requirements, will
also have a positive impact on facility performance.
For example, as previously mentioned, use of
advanced sensing technology may allow for more
effective process control as well as an enhanced
capability for the early detection and identification
of toxic substances. Special emphasis is being given
to identifying and developing measures that will have
“multiple benefits” as a means to increase the
likelihood that utilities will invest in security
enhancements. Once the project is complete, the
three project partners (ASCE, AWWA, and WEF)
will consider developing consensus industry standards
based on the guidance materials.

Research Needs
The current efforts described here should go a
long way toward making wastewater systems more
secure and better prepared for a variety of adverse
circumstances. Both EPA and WERF have
undertaken efforts to identify additional security
needs faced by wastewater systems. In 2002, EPA
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initiated a process to identify drinking water and
wastewater research and technical support security
needs. EPA’s process relied on stakeholder input
from the outset and resulted in a final “action plan”
in early 2004. WERF conducted a wastewater
security symposium in the summer of 2003 that
produced a prioritized research agenda that also was
published in early 2004. Both the EPA and WERF
efforts identified a very similar set of research needs.
The top two needs identified by WERF are
development of security-related design standards for
wastewater and stormwater facilities, and guidance
on the safe handling of contaminated materials and
treatment residuals. Efforts to address these
concerns are already underway. The other highest
priority needs identified by WERF include: addressing
interdependencies with other critical infrastructures
that could adversely affect wastewater systems;
demonstration of ways to detect contaminants of
concern in wastewater systems; and information on
physical security measures for wastewater systems.
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Conclusions
While the issue of security is new to the
wastewater sector, experience dealing with the
impacts of natural disasters and accidents on these
vital treatment systems has helped prepare utility
managers to cope with this new issue. Awareness
of the issue of security is growing, though managers
must balance competing pressures for scarce
resources within their systems. New tools that are
being developed and research that is being advanced
have and will continue to strengthen the basis for
sound decision-making.
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